Sign Up

Managed futures newsletter
Enter your email address to receive our free newsletter
 
Subscribe
Click here to gain free access. Build portfolios, set watchlists, and view more data and statistics.

Margin to Equity ratios in Managed Futures

July 28, 2008

 

As frequent readers of this piece know, we have always been proponents of assessing CTA and trading system performance on risk adjusted return ratios like the Sterling, Sortino, etc instead of just looking at total return or YTD numbers; as those ratios allow one to view returns in relation to risk.

A return of 30%, for example, is nice, but at what cost? If two programs both have 30% returns, but one has twice as much volatility to get those returns; the lower volatility program would have a Sharpe ratio twice that of the higher volatility program. The amount of volatility and whether a return is associated with large drawdowns need to always be considered side by side with any return number.

But there are several risks which don’t show up in the normal risk adjusted ratios (Sharpe, Sterling, Sortino, etc). For example, there is the “bus risk” of one man/woman CTA shops which rely on a single person making all of the decisions, entering trades, etc. What if they get hit by a bus? Who is managing the positions then? You won’t see that risk in the Sharpe ratio. There are also hidden risks such as the regulatory risks which surfaced with the talk earlier this month about Congress forbidding speculation on energy futures.

But not all hidden risks are outside of the statistics. A more tangible hidden risk can be found in the available statistics for CTAs with a little digging. That one missing ingredient in assessing risk adjusted performance ratios is how much margin is being used by the manager to achieve his or her risk adjusted performance. This metric is called the margin to equity ratio.

CTA Minimums

Let’s first review how an advisor's minimum investment amount is arrived at. Minimum investments for CTAs can be split into three distinct levels, specified as

1. the technical minimum amount needed to actually place the trades on the exchanges (the margin requirement)
2. the amount for an investor to withstand any eventual drawdown of the investment
3. the amount to make the percentage returns fit into generally accepted levels

1. Technical Amount: The amount technically needed to place trades is what the exchanges and clearing firms refer to as the margin requirement. Any account which wishes to trade a futures contract on a regulated futures exchange like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange must first have enough money in the account to cover the performance bond requirement of the exchange (the margin)

2. Drawdown Amount: The second part of the minimum investment amount - the amount an investor needs to withstand any eventual drawdown - is another technical level of sorts, on that we must have at least that amount in order to stay above zero. If the investment has the possibility of losing $150,000, for example, in the normal course of operation - than an investor better have at least that amount in order to proceed. If they didn't, they would have to get out of the investment during the normal ups and downs of the investment.

3. Window Dressing Amount: The third part of the minimum investment amount - the amount needed to make the percentages appealing to potential investors, or "window dressing" amount - is simply a subjective amount the advisor computes in order for the average returns and risk of his or her program to come out "nicely", for lack of a better term.

Margin to Equity Ratio:

Our concern for this article is the first level of a CTAs minimum investment amount above – the technical amount, or margin amount. And while the levels of margin used by a CTA will vary from CTA to CTA depending on the type of strategy they employ, markets traded, frequency of trading, and hold period, etc. – their minimum investment amounts do not tend to vary along the same scale.

So, it is not uncommon to have 5 CTAs each with $100,000 minimum investment amounts who each use different levels of margin in their trading. One may only trade a single market on a very quick time scale (out by the end of the day) and thus use only $5,000 in margin (or 5% of the minimum investment) on average. Another may be a diversified program with positions in multiple markets across multiple sectors, resulting in $30,000 in margin (or 30% of the minimum investment amount).

Luckily for us, this is a widely reported number for most CTAs, and one that is available on the detail page for each CTA program on the Attain Capital website. This number suffers from a slight self reporting bias, as it is a reported number by each CTA, not the actual statistic generated off of past data; but in our experience the reported number is close enough to the average amount used by the CTA to be meaningful.

The number reported by the CTAs is called the margin to equity ratio, and it is simply the dollar amount of margin they use for their base level accounts (on average) divided by the minimum investment amount. So, a CTA with a $100,000 minimum who has 10 positions which require $25,000 in margin on average can be said to have a 25% margin to equity ratio (often listed as M/E).

So what is a good margin to equity (M/E) ratio? Does it matter if one CTAs is higher/lower than another’s?

Unlike other ratios whose values don’t mean anything standing by themselves, only on a relative basis when comparing programs – the M/E ratio can be used both as a relative measure to compare programs, and as an absolute measure to give a clue as to future risk.

Comparing CTA returns using M/E:

When using the M/E ratio to compare programs, it all boils down to the technical amount needed to trade a CTA, the margin amount. Because 1/3 to 2/3 of a CTA investment is merely window dressing (the amount to make the reported returns look “nice”), we can effectively ignore that amount when trying to get down to the nuts and bolts of how the manager actually performed.

If two CTAs with $100,000 minimums both return 20% in a year, or $20,000 in profits – if one did so using 10% margin (investing $10K) and the other 30% margin (investing $30K), the return on the actual money used, the returns on margin used are actually 200% and 66%. We can all see that 200% is greater than 66%.

Another way to look at it is to put the return onto the total amount of capital being controlled. Take two fictitious managers who use S&P 500 futures, for example. The S&P 500 futures contract is worth $250 * the index price, and requires just $20,000 or so in margin to trade. With a current price of around 1250, trading a single S&P 500 futures contract means you “control” $312,500 through that contract (1250*$250)

When looking at it in those terms, and considering two fictitious managers who each require a $100,000 minimum investment, who both trade S&P futures, and who both made 20% last year, but one of which uses 3 times the margin to equity (thus 3 times the number of contracts), we can see that one manager is making $20K on $312K, and the other is making $20K on $937.5K.

The manager who can make the money on less capital invested is more attractive for several reasons. First, because they appear to be more skilled – doing more with less. Second, the use of less capital for the same return is more efficient. If the manager only needs $10K instead of $30K in order to make your expected profit, the extra $20K can be put to work elsewhere. Finally, a lower margin use means less capital is at risk in the market; which should lead to lower volatility and lower drawdowns over time. (over the short term, managers with high M/E ratios – especially option sellers - may not show their true colors and have low drawdowns and volatility despite the M/E telling us they are at risk of higher numbers)

Using M/E in absolute terms

But what if you’re not into notional funding, and don’t care that one manager is making money more efficiently than another. Many have said - if they are both making $20,000 in actual cash, and you put in $100K, so are making 20% or $20K in both instances, what’s the big deal with the margin to equity ratio? The issue is risk, and more specifically the hidden risk mentioned earlier that M/E can give clues to.

Unlike a Sharpe ratio of 1.65, for example, which tells us very little standing on its own; the M/E ratio can tell us quite a bit about a program when standing alone. I know that a 35% M/E on a $100K account, for example; is going to mean I will have to have at least $35,000 in free capital to post as margin for that program.

But the most important thing the M/E ratio can tell us are clues as to the potential future losses in store for the program it’s associated with. It is always important to remember that any statistics calculated using past performance are descriptive, not predictive. That is, they are merely showing us what did happen, and are not going to tell us what will happen.

Now, the M/E ratio is not predictive either; but it is not necessarily from past data like other stats. It is telling us the amount of risk (in terms of margin) the manager will be targeting in the future. And when considering that the exchanges set the margin numbers to equal roughly the amount of money a position could lose in a few day’s time, we can surmise that a really bad streak for a CTA where many if not all of its positions are losing simultaneously would equal that margin usage.

So a CTA’s M/E number can give us a quick back of the napkin look at what a new max DD may look like, for example. If a program has had just a 5% past Max DD, yet trades using a M/E of 35% - one should not be too surprised to see an intramonth Max DD of 20% to 30% in the future. Or if we see a program such as Rosetta which has a 30%+ DD, but a M/E of just 7%, we can ascertain that they have deleveraged their program since suffering the 30%+ DD.

In short, a higher margin to equity implies more risk as the manager is “controlling” more money, thus by definition has more money at risk. A CTA whose returns – especially option sellers with shorter track records – are very consistent with low drawdowns, but who has a high M/E ratio of 50% or higher, has probably just not had its bad streak yet, versus unlikely to ever have one.

In conclusion, with all else held equal – it is better to invest in a CTA with a lower margin to equity ratio. But it is not that easy all of the time. The M/E should really be used as a last tie breaker of sorts for two or more similar programs you are considering. If two trend followers you are looking at have similar risk/reward characteristics, choose the one with the lower M/E ratio.

You still have decisions about strategy types, non correlation, desired returns and what not to factor in. And as we do with the Sharpe, Sterling, et al – the M/E should also be used in conjunction with returns, as there’s no use choosing a program with a low M/E if it doesn’t have the returns you’re looking for.

The table below does just that. We calculated the compound ROR divided by the M/E for the 35 CTA programs tracked at Attain, and ranked the Top 10 by that metric – showing the top 10 CTAs at Attain who give the most bang for the buck… (the margin buck, that is).

IMPORTANT RISK DISCLOSURE


No Yes Was this article particularly interesting or helpful to you?

No Forward this email to a friend who might find it useful.

Not on our mailing list? Enter your email to receive this weekly newsletter: Subscribe

Feature | Week In Review: Energies continue sell off, grains follow suit

Overview

Jitters from the financial sector amid weaker earnings due to massive debt write downs continued to keep a lid on U.S. stock futures during the past week. Despite the gloom, economic reports showing stronger consumer sentiment and signs of a heart beat in the housing sector sparked relief in some sectors. For the week Dow futures lost -1.71% with S&P futures falling a minimal -.16%. The Tech sector seemed to find some bargain buying sparked by improve consumer readings as NASDAQ futures ended slightly higher +.74%. The excitement filtered into the small-cap area with the Russell gaining +2.5% and the Mid-cap ending the week just over unchanged levels.

The metals added to losses that started the previous week due to worries of a deeper world economic slowdown. The mentality seemed to rule in most commodity sectors and it was again evident in the industrial metals with Palladium losing -8.17%, Platinum down -5.31%, and Copper falling -1.85%. Silver – 4.64% and Gold -3.36% seemed to follow the lead of industrial metals.

Consumption worries tied to the worldwide economic slowdown sparked another round of selling in the energy complex. Crude Oil lost -4.80%, RBOB Gas shed -4.79%, and Heating Oil lost -4.76%. Natural Gas found added pressure from a stronger build in supplies due to lighter demand than expected summer demand due to cooler temperatures and ended the week down -14.33%.

The grain and food sectors were a mixed bag last week with activity in the grains being the main feature as they lost more ground on ideas that a more favorable weather scenario will increase production. Corn down shed -5.80%, Soybeans lost -4.36%, and Wheat ended steady. Most sectors in the food arena ended near steady, although OJ lost -10.33% due to a fairly calm hurricane season to date. The livestock sector again posted mixed results as Lean Hogs gained +2.27% and Live Cattle ended near unchanged levels with spreading the main component of activity on ideas that cheaper pork will be more consumer friendly versus beef during tough economic times.

CTAs

For most option managers, the volatility in their own returns this month passed them by a few weeks ago. Several managers saw 5-10% swings; however as most seasoned option investors are aware of, the volatility can and will be much larger when working with higher margin managers like Ascendant, Ace, Zephyr, or LJM. This month proved this point once again in the Ascendant S1 program which encountered a swing from -30% back on July 15th back to a positive 5% as of this past Friday...for anyone counting that's a 35% swing in 8 trading days (very volatile).

Other estimated option trading returns for July are as follows: ACE Investment Strategist +0.88%, Cervino Diversified Options +1.06%, Cervino Diversified 2x +2.60%, Cervino COP +1.11%, Crescent Bay PSI -0.56%, Crescent bay BVP -5%, Diamond Capital +0.20%, FCI +0.64%, LJM Partners +5.06%, Rathiel -0.64%, Zenith Index +1.33%, Zenith Diversified +1.38%, Zephyr Aggressive +1.65%, Zephyr Moderate +1.55%.

In the agriculture markets July has not seen too many surprises. The estimated results are as follows; Chicago Capital +1.19%, NDX Abednego -4.75%, NDX Shadrach -6.6%, and Rosetta +1.34%. While the NDX drawdown may seem larger than normal, it is important to note that the pull back has been in open trade equity from the equity highs made at the end of June and most likely does not reflect the drawdown for brand new clients as the manager will enter into new trades only for those accounts.

Multi market trend following style managers continue their July struggles last week. CTA’s that have been holding long in energies and grains have given back the most profits as the bubble in those two sectors has seemingly popped. The strong correlation between these two sectors has caused gains to deteriorate quickly and you can bet many managers will be analyzing the correlations between crude oil and other commodities for years to come.

Elsewhere the volatility and choppy trade seen in treasuries and stocks has also caused losses in many portfolios. Summer trading conditions are also in full effect as trading volume has been lower than average over the last week.

With all of the above in mind it is not surprising to see many managers in the red for July. Clarke Capital has done the best job of avoiding the volatility as its Global Magnum (+0.42% est) and Global Basic (-0.15% est) are both near breakeven for the month. Clarke has been smart and watched most of recent market activity from the sidelines. Northside Trading has also remained close to breakeven as well at -0.44% est and like Clarke has not established any new trades this month. The next level of managers include the Attain Portfolio Advisors – Strategic Diversification Program which is down -1.34%, Optimus Capital (-3.09% est) and Dighton USA (- 3.43% est) for the month. The third tier includes Robinson-Langley (-6.52% est) and Hoffman Asset (-8.17%). Finally, mangers hit hardest thus far include Attain Portfolio Advisors Modified Program (-11.94% est) and Long Term Trading Navigator (-14.72% est).

Trading Systems

Lackluster trading conditions last week kept things quiet for trading systems. It was the first week in several months in which global futures markets took a step back from their extreme volatility.

Starting with the day trading systems, Compass SP was the top performer +$2,581.25 on a pair of trades. Rayo Plus Dax wasn’t too far behind +$2,038.21 on three trades for the week. Waugh eRL had success on its four trades good for +$1,218 for the week. Kappa Dax had some ups and downs throughout the week but ended up in the black +$328.57 for the week.

Moving on to the swing trading systems, about half of the programs held onto their respective positions last week. Those that flipped their positions-Signum EBL reversed short on Monday for a loss of -$2,388, Tzar eRL reversed long late in the week for a loss of -$2,714.94 on the closed out trade and Seasonal ST ES reversed long for a loss of -$1,955. Signum TY continues to hold short, Mesa Notes long and Tzar ES/NQ short.

Long term trading was equally as slow as many systems have exited a large portion of their trades with the recent reversal across the majority of the commodity markets. Look for trend following programs to exit the remainder of their long grain/metals/energy/currency positions as well and look for new short entries, particularly for programs that operate on a shorter time frame. Aberration Plus exited its long Mini Silver position for a loss of -$1,568 on the trade.

IMPORTANT RISK DISCLOSURE
Futures based investments are often complex and can carry the risk of substantial losses. They are intended for sophisticated investors and are not suitable for everyone. The ability to withstand losses and to adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can adversely affect investor returns.

Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. The performance data for the various Commodity Trading Advisor ("CTA") and Managed Forex programs listed above are compiled from various sources, including Barclay Hedge, Attain Capital Management, LLC's ("Attain") own estimates of performance based on account managed by advisors on its books, and reports directly from the advisors. These performance figures should not be relied on independent of the individual advisor's disclosure document, which has important information regarding the method of calculation used, whether or not the performance includes proprietary results, and other important footnotes on the advisor's track record.

The dollar based performance data for the various trading systems listed above represent the actual profits and losses achieved on a single contract basis in client accounts, and are inclusive of a $50 per round turn commission ($30 per e-mini contracts). Except where noted, the gains/losses are for closed out trades. The actual percentage gains/losses experienced by investors will vary depending on many factors, including, but not limited to: starting account balances, market behavior, the duration and extent of investor's participation (whether or not all signals are taken) in the specified system and money management techniques. Because of this, actual percentage gains/losses experienced by investors may be materially different than the percentage gains/losses as presented on this website.

Please read carefully the CFTC required disclaimer regarding hypothetical results below.

HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN; IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK OF ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT TRADING RESULTS.